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Motivated by the process of economic development in Eastern Germany since the German 
reunification we set up a dynamic macroeconomic model of a small open economy where 
both capital and labor are mobile and there are increasing returns to scale at the aggregate 
level. The model features multiple equilibria as well as (local and global) indeterminacy. 
Expectations matter for resulting equilibrium dynamics, implying that economic confidence 
may be crucial for the process of economic development. Despite its simplicity, the model can 
replicate major empirical facts and bears a number of non-trivial implications. 
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The German reuniﬁcation in 1991 represents a drastic example of an economy that was subject
to a comprehensive integration shock. After 1991 a whole economy with hitherto highly restricted
labor and capital mobility, namely East Germany, became integrated into a nearly frictionless
world labor and capital market. In this paper we address the question about the determinants
of macroeconomic development in response to such far-ranging changes in institutional settings.
We argue that an empirically plausible macroeconomic model should exhibit multiple long run
equilibria. The major question then concerns the mechanisms that may lead the economy either to
the good or to the bad long run equilibrium. The literature, discussed below, has stressed "history"
(initial conditions) and "expectations" (conﬁdence, moods, sentiment) as potential equilibrium
selection mechanisms. A better understanding of the process of macroeconomic development in
small open economies requires that both the relative importance as well as the possible interaction
between these mechanisms need to be clariﬁed. In addition, it is unclear how public policy interacts
with these mechanisms in the process of equilibrium selection. We take the prominent example
of Eastern Germany as an opportunity to study an economy where factors of production are
unexpectedly given the possibility of moving out of or into the domestic market economy.
The neoclassical textbook model does not appear helpful when trying to better understand
this process. Suppose that output  is produced under constant returns to scale according to
 = 1− and that both capital  and labor  have an outside option, denoted as ¯  and
¯ . It can be easily veriﬁed that the equilibrium capital intensity and per capita output are then
given by ˜  =  ¯ 
(1−)¯  and ˜  = ˜  (the size of the economy in terms of, say,  is indeterminate).
Provided that all economies face the same outside options (¯  and ¯ ) and have access to the same
technology, one should observe convergence in capital intensities and in the level of per capita
incomes. However, this implication is at odds with real-world experience. For instance, Uhlig
(2006, p. 383) has pointed to the observation of "limited convergence" between Eastern and
Western Germany. Moreover, if we think of a national economy as being composed of a set of
1regional economies, and assume that every region satisﬁes the conditions mentioned above, then
we should clearly expect convergence in regional per capita incomes. However, also this implication
appears to be at odds with the data, at least for Eastern Germany (see Section 2).
We employ a straightforward modiﬁcation of the textbook model sketched above to better
understand the process of macroeconomic development in Eastern Germany. Two modiﬁcations are
undertaken. First, we assume that factor relocation is subject to mobility costs. This assumption
introduces the dynamic dimension and implies that agents need to form expectations about the
future. Second, there are increasing returns to scale (IRS) at the aggregate level due to productive
government expenditures. As a consequence, there are multiple equilibria (ME) as well as (local
and global) indeterminacy implying that expectations matter for resulting equilibrium dynamics.
More speciﬁcally, expectations may be crucial, ﬁrst, for the steady state the economy approaches
in the long run and, second, for the equilibrium trajectory which leads the economy to the (inferior
or superior) steady state.
The small scale model employed in this paper is in line with major stylized facts, described
in Section 2, and delivers a number of non-trivial implications. Among these are the following:
(i) the success of macroeconomic development is determined by history and expectations; (ii) the
relative importance of expectations as major determinant of macroeconomic success depends on
public policy in a systematic fashion; and (iii) the set of admissible, i.e. fundamentally warranted,
expectations depends on initial conditions and on public policy.
Two strands of related literature should be mentioned. First, there are by now a number of
contributions which focus on the process of macroeconomic development in Eastern Germany. For
instance, Funke and Strulik (2000) and Burda (2006) have investigated the pattern of East-West
convergence employing dynamic macroeconomic models. Snower and Merkl (2006) and Uhlig
(2006) have studied the sources and consequences of the substantial and persistent increase in
unemployment ﬁgures using labor market models. Second, there is a large number of contributions
dealing with IRS and ME in real macroeconomic models (e.g. Murphy et al., 1989; Benhabib and
2Farmer, 1994). It is well known that IRS may lead to ME. An important question, then, is how
the process of equilibrium selection works. Most models imply that initial conditions are crucial
(Deissenberg et al., 2001). Krugman (1991) has demonstrated that it is, in principle, both history
and expectations that matter.
The paper contributes to a better understanding of the process of macroeconomic development
in small open economies in general and, more speciﬁcally, in Eastern Germany since 1991. It
demonstrates that both history and expectations matter. In addition, it is shown that gradual
changes in public policy measures may lead to drastic changes in economic outcomes. Moreover,
our paper contributes also to the literature which discusses the mechanisms of equilibrium selection
in models with ME by demonstrating that the relative importance of expectations depends on
public policy in a systematic fashion.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 describes major stylized facts of macroeconomic
development in Eastern Germany since 1991. Section 3 sets up the basic model, describes the
resulting dynamic system and the implied steady state solutions. Section 4 is devoted to the
discussion of stability, equilibrium dynamics and global indeterminacy. Section 5 illustrates the
model implications by conducting numerical evaluations. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2S o m e s t y l i z e d f a c t s
The process of real macroeconomic development in Eastern Germany since 1991 may be sketched
by the following list of stylized facts:1
1. Real GDP per capita grew by an average annual rate of 3.6 percent between 1991 and 2007.
2. The standard deviation of real GDP per capita across Eastern German regions increased
between 1992 and 2006 by roughly 80 percent (country subdivisions according to NUTS
1The data for stylized facts 1. to 3. are taken, respectively, from: 1. Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche
Gesamtrechnungen der Laender" (2008(a)); 2. Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Laender"
(2008(b)), 3. Statistisches Bundesamt, Genesis database (2008).
32, "Regierungsbezirke") and by 114 percent (country subdivisions according to NUTS 3,
"Kreise").2
3. At the aggregate level there has been substantial emigration. Between 2000 and 2006 about
70,000 people (0.5 percent of the population) emigrated from Eastern Germany per annum
(Burda, 2006, p. 368).3 However, there are important regional diﬀerences. Some regions
shrank substantially and, at the same time, there are regions which attracted people to a
substantial extent.
4. At the aggregate level there has been a substantial inﬂow of private capital. From 1991 to
2004 capital inﬂows amounted to 80 to 90 billion EUR, or about 20 percent of GDP, each
year (Burda, 2006, p. 368).
5. Between 1991 and 2004 Eastern Germany has received massive ﬁscal transfers of about 80
billion EUR per year (4 percent of Germany’s GDP). About 50 percent constitute social
assistance (Snower and Merkl, 2006, p. 375).
The observation of regional divergence of per capita incomes (stylized fact #2) provides im-
portant evidence with regard to the underlying macroeconomic structure. The divergence pattern
among Eastern German regions is therefore considered more deeply. Figure 1 shows the time
path of the standard deviation of real GDP per capita between 1991 and 2006 for country sub-
divisions NUTS 2 ("Regierungsbezirke") and for country subdivisions NUTS 3 ("Kreise"). Both
graphs clearly indicate regional divergence. Moreover, Figure 2 shows the kernel density estima-
tion (essentially a smoothed histogram) for the regional distribution of GDP per capita (country
2Divergence at the level of Eastern German "Laender" (NUTS 1) is less pronounced. The standard deviation
increased between 1991 and 2007 by roughly 29%.
3Moreover, the unemployment rate increased from 10 percent in 1991 to almost 20 percent in 2004 (Snower,
Merkl, 2006, p. 375).
4subdivisions NUTS 3) in 1996 and 2006.4 These plots conﬁrm regional divergence of per capita
incomes. The regional income distribution in 1996 appears unimodal, whereas in 2006 it appears
bimodal. The upper tale became thicker, i.e. there are regions clustering in the upper range of
regional income distribution.5 Vollmer et al. (2010) decompose the (entire) German distribution
of annual GDP per employee into two components using a two-component normal mixture model
for the years 1992 until 2006. This allows them to identify those districts (NUTS 3) that moved
from the ﬁrst to the second component. Subsequently, a standard cross-sectional growth regression
is extended to include a mover dummy, which is highly signiﬁcant. The growth rate of a mover
district is about one percentage point higher than the growth rate of non-mover district which had
the same GDP per worker in 1992. Vollmer et al. (2010, p. 10) conclude "...that districts in the
East converge to two diﬀerent steady states regardless of their initial GDP" and state "...we can
see two convergence clubs in the East that start to separate between 1999 and 2001".
Figure 1: Divergence among East German Regions.
4A complete data set for the 102 East German "Kreise" is available for the ﬁrst time in 1996. The results for 1994
and 1995 are qualitatively identical (for 1993 no data is provided). For 1992 the data set comprises only 82 "Kreise".
The kernel density graph is produced using EViews. As kernel density weighting function the Epanechnikov kernel
(default option) is used and the bandwidth parameter (controlling the smoothness of the graph) is data-based.
5The following "Kreise" have more than 45 perecnt of average Eastern GDP per capita in 2006: Dresden, Erfurt,
Jena, Neubrandenburg, Potsdam, Schwerin, Wismar, Zwickau.
5Figure 2: The emergence of twin peaks.
It should be observed that this divergence pattern is in stark contrast to the basic neoclassical
model. This conclusion is reinforced by noting that the degree of factor mobility appears to be
quite high. Eastern Germany has unrestricted access to the international capital market and major
migration costs associated with cultural and lingual diﬀerences do not apply (Hunt, 2006). More-
over, there are substantial productive government expenditures, funded by the central government,
which aim at a "harmonization of living conditions" (as prescribed by the German constitution)
by uniformly distributed public infrastructure investment.6
3 The model
We consider a dynamic one-sector model of a small open economy, which comprises a number of 
regions. Every region is identical except for the initial amount of labor and capital allocated to the
region’s domestic market sector and the degree of initial optimism or pessimism. For simplicity
regions do not interact. Both labor and capital have an outside option. Moving input factors out
6The prescription of "harmonization of living conditions" is codiﬁed in Art. 72, § 106(3) and Art. 20 of the
German Constitution ("Grundgesetz").
6of or into the domestic market sector is associated with mobility costs. The model features IRS
at the aggregate level due to productive government expenditures à la Barro (1990). Technically,
this model can be viewed as a two-dimensional extension of the Krugman (1991) model.
3.1 Production technology and factor prices






 ,( 1 )
where  denotes regional productive government expenditures (e.g., regional infrastructure in-
vestment, commercial zone development investment),  is capital employed in region ,  is the
amount of labor employed in region ,w h e r e ∈ {1} indexes the regions, and 0  1.
We assume that regional productive government expenditures are proportional to regional tax
receipts, i.e.
 = ,( 2 )
where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 denotes the unique tax rate levied on capital and labor income and 0 is the
share of local tax receipts which is used to ﬁnance productive government expenditures. We do
not impose a balanced budget ( =1 ) for two reasons: First, there are other uses of tax receipts
which are not modeled here (e.g., social transfers) and, second, regional productive government
expenditures are typically matched by grants provided by the central government (hence  might
be even larger than unity). The crucial assumption here is that there are (regional) productive
government expenditures, labeled , which vary positively with regional tax receipts.7 This
might capture productive government expenditures ﬁnanced exclusively by regional authorities
or productive government expenditures co-ﬁnanced by the central government through matching
7Regional tax receipts in Germany are primarily composed of a share of the personal income tax, a share of the
value added tax, and the corporate income tax.
7grants.8









 .( 3 )
Notice that this model features IRS, since 1
1−  1, in capital and labor at the aggregate
level.9 Forming the partial derivative of equ. (1) with respect to  and , holding  ﬁxed, and

























where  denotes the wage rate and  the rate of return to capital in region . Under (aggregate)
IRS, the level of factor prices and, hence, the level of per capita income is crucially determined by
the amount of labor and capital allocated to the domestic market sector. Therefore, we turn to
the allocation decisions of workers and capital owners at next.
3.2 Workers
There are (0) =  identical workers initially in region , who live forever (to simplify nota-
tion, the region index is suppressed in what follows). Each worker supplies one unit of time per
time period, independent of the wage rate, to the labor market. East German workers have the
possibility of moving to Western Germany. Migration decisions are modelled according to Braun
8Public policy instruments which are designed as matching grants comprise sponsorships within the framework
of "Gemeinschaftsaufgabe" and "Europäische Strukturförderung" (Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stad-
tentwicklung, 2006)
9The mechanism that gives rise to (aggregate) IRS is productive government expenditures. The basic results
described below do not, however, depend on this speciﬁc mechanism.






[¯  − (1 − )]− (6)
where 0 denotes the time preference rate,  is the competitive wage rate in Eastern
Germany, 0 1 is a linear labor income tax, and ¯  is the wage rate (net of taxes) that can be
earned in Western Germany. Notice that 

 (0) gives the present value of the diﬀerence between
earnings in the outside option and in the domestic market sector. Since the competitive wage rate
 depends on the amount of labor and capital employed in the domestic market sector, 

 (0)
captures expectations about the future economic development.





where ˙  ≥ 0 denotes the ﬂow of migrants from Eastern to Western Germany per period of
time. The parameter   0 is an inverse measure of the importance of moving cost. According to
equ. (7) migration cost are assumed to increase with the number of migrants due to congestion (cf.
Braun, 1993, p. 24).11 Notice that the individual moving decision is a binary decision. Migrants
leave the economy if the beneﬁto fm i g r a t i o n ,r e ﬂected by 

 , exceeds the migration cost given





˙  (cf. Braun, 1993, p. 25). Moreover, if the beneﬁt of leaving Eastern Germany is
zero, 

 =0 , no one will want to emigrate, i.e. ˙  =0 . Similarly, provided that 

  0,o n e
gets ˙  =0 . In summary, East-West migration may be described as follows
10The Braun (1993) model of migration and growth represents a dynamic, representative-agent model (see also
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Chapter 9.1.3).
11The key property is that the cost of moving for the marginal mover rises with the number of movers. This
relation would also hold if there were heterogeneity with respect to moving costs. The persons with lower costs
would move sooner, and the cost of moving would therefore rise at the margin with the number of movers (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 401).
9˙  =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


















[(1 − ) − ¯ ]−





. The cost per migrant is again given by  = 1

˙ ,w h e r e ˙  ≥ 0 denotes the
ﬂow of migrants from Western to Eastern Germany per period of time. Applying an analogous
reasoning as before yields
˙  =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨













The number of workers in the Eastern German region, denoted as , changes according to
˙  = ˙  − ˙  (10)
We now draw the following case distinction
1. Assume 

  0 (implying 

  0). Noting (8), (9), (10) this gives ˙  = ˙  | {z }
=0








 =0 ). Noting (8), (9), (10) this gives ˙  = ˙  | {z }
=0





  0 (implying 











, may be expressed as follows
˙  = 

 Q 0 for 

 Q 0 (11)
Ac l a r i ﬁcation may be warranted. Consider Eastern German regions which satisfy 

  0.D o e s
the model imply that the region with the highest wage rate attracts Western German workers ﬁrst
10and then other regions develop at next? Assuming that there are enough workers outside the
economy for a simultaneous development of all regions which experience a favorable economic
development, the answer is no.
3.3 Capital owners
Every Eastern German region is populated by a continuum of length one of identical capital
owners.12 Each capitalist is endowed with ¯  units of capital. Capital can be employed in the
region’s domestic market sector earning a rate of return . Alternatively, capital can be invested
abroad to earn the ﬁxed rate of return ¯ 0. The representative East German capital owner



















 ˙  = 

(0) = ¯  0 ≤  ≤ ¯ ,
where 0 denotes the time preference rate and ˙  := . Moving capital from the region’s
domestic market sector to the outside option, or vice versa, causes (symmetric and convex) capital







denotes a control variable. More precisely, moving one additional unit of capital from, say, Eastern
to Western Germany causes relocation costs of
˙ 
 , i.e. marginal adjustment costs increase with the
ﬂow of capital being transferred.13 The parameter   0 is an inverse measure of the importance
12To simplify, we assume that capital owners don’t move. The location of capital owners is not important since
we are interested in the determinants of GDP, not in the determinants of GNP.
13There are indeed convex capital reallocation costs at the individual level. This is consistent with the following
interpretation. If the individual capital owner transfers ﬁnancial funds, no cost is incurred. The accumulation of
physical capital is, however, associated with convex capital adjustment costs, even at the individual level according
to Hayashi (1982).
11of adjustment costs. Notice also that, by assumption, the East German capital owner has all his
capital ¯  allocated to the East German region initially, i.e. (0) = ¯ . Thus he can either
keep all his capital inside the region’s domestic market sector or start investing abroad. An increase
in the region’s stock of capital then requires foreign capital inﬂows.
Let  := (
) denote the associated (current value) Hamiltonian function. The


















 − [(1 − ) − ¯ ] (13)
The eﬃciency condition (12) says that, in equilibrium, marginal moving cost 
 must equal
the shadow price 






[(1 − ) − ¯ ]−,i . e . 

(0)
gives the present value of the diﬀerence between earnings in the domestic market sector and in
the outside option.14 As before, since the competitive rate of return  depends on the amount
of capital and labor employed in the domestic market sector, (0) captures expectations about
future economic development.



















 ˙  = 

(0) = ¯  0 ≤  ≤ ¯ . (14)
The typical West German capital owner has total wealth ¯ , which is completely invested in
West Germany (or the rest of the world) initially.
P h y s i c a lc a p i t a li n v e s t e di nt h eE a s t e r nG e r m a nr e g i o ni sg i v e nb y =  +(¯  − ),
14This solution for 
(0) requires that the boundary condition 
()=0(the so-called "soft landing condition")
holds, where  denotes the point in time where the economy hits a boundary (see Section 3.4).
12implying that the rate of change in physical capital per period of time may be expressed as
˙  = ˙  − ˙  (15)
Let 







[¯  − (1 − )]−. It can then be readily shown that the following relations must
hold in equilibrium (from 


=0 ,  ≤ ¯  and 


=0 ,  ≤ ¯ )
˙  =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
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 is the shadow value placed on capital in East Germany and 

 is the shadow
value placed on capital invested in Western Germany (or the rest of the world). Since there are
only these two investment possibilities (investments in East Germany and investments outside East




 . We now draw the following case distinction
1. Assume 

  0 (implying 




















˙  = ˙  |{z}
=0





  0 (implying 
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13In summary, the equation of motion for  reads15
˙  = 

 Q 0 for 

 Q 0 (18)
As stated above, the focus is on Eastern Germany (or Eastern German regions). Therefore,
we consider variables that relate to Eastern Germany only. Moreover, to simplify the notation
we set 

 =  and 

 = . This notation then implies that expectations of Eastern German
workers such that   0 implies pessimism in the sense that the diﬀerence between earnings in
the domestic market sector and earnings in the outside option, in present value terms, is negative.
3.4 Complete dynamic system and steady states
From (11), (18), diﬀerentiating (0) =
∞ Z
0
[(1 − ) − ¯ ]− with respect to , and (13) the
dynamic system which governs the evolution of the economy within the interior of the state space
is as follows
˙  =  (19)
˙  =  (20)
˙  =  − [(1 − ) − ¯ ] (21)
˙  =  − [(1 − ) − ¯ ] (22)
(0) = 0 (0) = 0
where  and  are given by (4) and (5). Provided that (0) and (0) are speciﬁed, the above
system describes a unique trajectory in four-dimensional ( )-space. However, (0)
and (0) are not uniquely determined. There is rather an inﬁnite number of shadow price
combinations {(0) (0)} which are admissible as self-fulﬁlling prophecies. It is nonetheless
i m p o r t a n tt os t r e s st h a ta n ys e to fa d m i s s i b l ee x p e c t a t i o n s{ (0) (0)}i sr e s t r i c t e dt ob e
15We assume that there is enough capital outside the economy for a simultaneous development of all regions
heading towards the superior equilibrium.
14fundamentally warranted. That is, economic fundamentals and public policy restrict the range of
admissible expectations, as explained in Section 4.1 below.
A steady state is determined by ˙  = ˙  = ˙  = ˙  =0 .W eﬁrst turn to the interior steady
state. From ˙  =  and ˙  =  one recognizes that ˙  = ˙  =0requires  =  =0 .
From (21), (22),  =  =0(implying ˙  = ˙  =0 )o n eg e t s(1 − ) =¯  and (1 − ) =¯ .
These two equations in  and  characterize the interior steady state in (, )-plane.16 Noting

























1−  1 the RHS of (23) is increasing and concave in  and since 
−  1
(assuming  ) the RHS of (24) is increasing and convex in . Hence, there is a unique interior
solution {∗ ∗} (Figure 3, point A). There are also two boundary steady states. The lower
(inferior) steady state is { =0 =0 } (Figure 3, point C). The upper (superior) steady state
reads { = ∗∗= ¯ } (Figure 3, point B).
As regards the dynamics at the border of the state space, two aspects need to be clariﬁed.
First, the economy remains at the boundary once it touches the border of the state space (see the
appendix for details). Second, in a world of IRS we need to ensure that factor inﬂows sooner or
later come to a halt. It is assumed that some political mechanism prevents more than a maximum
amount of labor being supplied to the region’s domestic market sector. This maximum amount of
labor is denoted as ¯ . The maximum amount of capital, ∗∗, is then endogenously determined by
(1 − )(∗∗ ¯ )=¯ . To illustrate, assume that the economy hits, say, the upper -boundary at
 = , i.e. ()=¯ ,w i t h0  ()  ∗∗. The dynamics of the economy is then governed by
(20) and (22) (noting that ()=¯ ). The shadow price  at  =  jumps in order to satisfy the
16Notice, however, that (1 − ) =¯  and (1 − ) =¯  are necessary but not suﬃcient for ˙  =0and ˙  =0 ;
suﬃcient for ˙  =0( ˙  =0 )i s =0( =0 ).
15transversality condition. Capitalists then increase the amount of capital allocated to the domestic
market sector until (1 − ) =¯ . This movement is sluggish because of convex adjustment costs














Figure 3: Multiple equilibria.
4 Stability, equilibrium dynamics, and global indeterminacy
The technical properties of the underlying model are discussed concisely in this section. This is
a necessary prerequisite to understand the results outlined in Section 5. We impose the parame-
ter restriction  =  =0 5. The dynamic system under study then becomes linear and allows
for an analytical solution. This special case enables us to analyze the model more deeply and to
demonstrate its implications. This procedure obviously comes at the cost of imposing an unreal-
istic parameter restriction since the implied degree of IRS is 2.17 It must also be assumed that
17Schmitt-Grohé (1997) reviews the empirical evidence on IRS at the level of industries. She ﬁnds that the degree
of IRS ranges from 1.03 to 1.4 (Schmitt-Grohé, 1997, Table 4; see also the literature cited in Graham and Temple,
2006). Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that  ∈ [016039] (Aschauer, 1989; Finn, 1993).
16some exogenous (political) mechanism prevents unlimited capital inﬂows; the maximum amount
of capital is denoted as ¯ .
4.1 Stability and equilibrium dynamics
From (1−) =¯  and (1−) =¯  together with  =0 5 and  =0 5 (from (4) and (5)
together with  =  =0 5), the interior steady state turns out to read ∗ = 2¯ 




 =0  and 
∗
 =0 . It can be shown that there are always three eigenvalues with positive real
parts (for details see the appendix). The interior steady state is hence unequivocally unstable.18
There is a three-dimensional unstable manifold leading away from the interior steady state. Since
there are two (predetermined) state variables and two jump variables, there is indeterminacy
in the sense of a multiplicity of admissible initial shadow prices {(0) (0)} that constitute
equilibrium dynamics. Figure 4 shows the (unstable) interior steady state (point A) and several
possible equilibrium trajectories leading to one of the boundary steady states (point B or C). As
regards the admissible equilibrium trajectories, several remarks are at order:
1. Equilibrium trajectories must approach the border of the state region tangential, i.e. satis-
fying either ˙ ()=()=0or ˙ ()=()=0("soft landing condition"). Once the
economy hits the border it does not return into the interior of the state space. Instead it
moves along the boundary to one of the border equilibria (for details see the appendix).
2. Starting with initial conditions (0) = 0 and (0) = 0 there is an inﬁnite number of
shadow price combinations {(0) (0)} which are admissible as self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
Hence, there is an inﬁnite number of equilibrium trajectories, indexed by initial shadow
prices, satisfying the soft landing criterion.
3. Initial shadow prices are exogenous. The set of admissible shadow prices is, however, re-
18This proposition extends to the more general case where  =  =0 5 does not hold. Figure A1 in the appendix
demonstrates that the number of eigenvalues (at the interior steady state) with positive real parts does not change
in response to (admissible) variations in  and .
17stricted. More speciﬁcally, shadow prices must satisfy two conditions: (i) they must be
fundamentally warranted, i.e. equal the present value of expected earning diﬀerentials and
(ii) they must be compatible with equilibrium, i.e. induce a trajectory that satisﬁes the soft
landing condition.
4.2 Global indeterminacy (the "overlap")
Both history (initial state variables) and expectations (initial shadow prices) determine to which
equilibrium the region ultimately converges. If the region starts inside a speciﬁc( )-set, expec-
tations (initial shadow prices) determine whether the region moves towards the superior or inferior
steady state, i.e. the model exhibits global indeterminacy. Within this "area of global indetermi-
nacy" or "overlap", a term coined by Krugman (1991), knowledge about initial state variables is
not suﬃcient to determine the ﬁnal outcome. In contrast, if the economy starts with suﬃciently
unfavorable initial conditions (i.e. South-West of the overlap) it converges to the inferior steady
state. Similarly, if it starts with suﬃciently favorable initial conditions (i.e. North-East of the
overlap) it converges to the superior steady state.
To visualize the overlap, we have discretized the state space, i.e. we have deﬁned a grid of points
in ()-space. Then we have checked whether, for a speciﬁc( )-combination, there is at least
one set of admissible expectations {(0) (0)}w h i c hg i v e sr i s et oat r a j e c t o r yl e a d i n gt ot h e
superior steady state and, for the same ()-combination, there is at least one set of admissible
expectations {(0) (0)} which gives rise to a trajectory leading to the inferior steady state.
If this condition is satisﬁed, the ()-combination under consideration is part of the overlap. If
this is not the case, the speciﬁc( )-combination lies outside the overlap.19
Figure 4 illustrates the basic logic of the model. The parameters ( ¯ ,¯ ) have been chosen such
that the interior steady state is centered; in Figures 4 and 5 ¯  and ¯  have been normalized to
one. The overlap is represented by the shaded area. Consider a region starting at, say, point D.
19A description of the underlying numerical procedure is available from the authors upon request.
18Provided that agents are suﬃciently optimistic (e.g., (0) (0)  0) both workers and capitalists
increasingly engage in the region’s domestic market sector. The economy moves towards the upper
border  = ¯ . In contrast, if agents are pessimistic, i.e. (0) (0)  0, both labor and capital
leave the region’s domestic market sector and the economy is heading towards the lower -border
and eventually approaches the inferior equilibrium at point C.20
How can the boundary of the overlap intuitively be understood? To illustrate, consider a
region with initial endowments such that this region is located inside the overlap close to the
lower boundary (not displayed). There is both a set of pessimistic expectations that lead the
economy to the inferior steady state and a set of optimistic expectations that lead the economy
to the superior steady state. Now, think of a reduction of the initial amount of capital such that
the new point is located outside (i.e. South-West of) the overlap. The situation has changed
drastically in that there is now merely a set of pessimistic expectations that forces the economy
to follow an unfavorable economic development. The economic reason can be seen by noting,
ﬁrst, that the, say, competitive wage rate decreases with the amount of capital allocated the




[(1 − ) − ¯ ]−, implying that a reduction in  decreases, ceteris paribus, (0).
Stated diﬀerently, successive reductions of capital sooner or later imply that expectations, which
lead the economy to the superior steady state are not fundamentally warranted anymore. Hence,
as u ﬃciently large reduction of capital moves the economy outside the overlap.
Figure 5 demonstrates the size of the overlap in response to changes of the share of local tax
receipts used to ﬁnance productive government expenditures, . Extensive experimentation has
shown that the overlap increases with . This makes good economic sense since an increase in 
strengthens the interdependence among the agents’ decisions across groups. This becomes evident
by recalling that the competitive wage rate is  =0 5 and the competitive interest rate reads
20Equilibrium trajectories could, of course, also hit the (lower or upper) -boundary for interior -values. This
pattern is, however, rarely observed for plausible calibrations.
19 =0 5. Hence, a strict supply-side policy gives expectations a greater role.
Figure 4: Three steady states and four possible equilibrium trajectories.
Figure 5: Overlap in response to  (smaller, grey shaded area:  =0 45; larger, red shaded area:
 =0 5).
Is a large overlap good or bad? The answer is that it is neither good nor bad. A large overlap
20may imply that, even under unfavorable initial conditions, the economy is capable, due to strong
optimism, of moving towards the superior steady state. In contrast, even under favorable initial
conditions there is the risk that, due to a high degree of pessimism, the inferior steady state
is ultimately realized. In this sense, the economy becomes more vulnerable against bad moods.
Hence, an adequate, although fairly general, proposition states that the relative importance of
expectations vis-à-vis history increases with the size of the overlap.
5 Numerical evaluation
5.1 Sketch of the underlying procedure
The model is evaluated in the following manner. First, we consider a "large number" of regions
 ∈ {1}. Every region starts with a speciﬁc combination {(0) (0)}, which is restricted
to fall inside the upper left of the state plane (see Figure 6 for an illustration). This assumption
implies (1 − )  ¯  and (1 − )  ¯  being compatible with the empirical observations of
(aggregate) labor outﬂows and (aggregate) capital inﬂows. Second, initial shadow prices (0)
are drawn from a normal distribution with given [(0)] and  [(0)] (motivated below). The
values of (0) are then determined by the soft landing criterion, i.e. ()=0or ()=0 ,
where  denotes the point in time when the economy hits a boundary. Once, (0) (0), (0)
and (0) are speciﬁed, one can trace out () () for all  ∈ [0] and  ∈ {1}.T h i r d ,
we calculate the time path of average per capita income (): =

() 
(). T h i si sd o n ef o rt h e
baseline set of parameters. Finally, we change [(0)] to better understand the mechanics of
the model.
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Figure 6: Illustration of the underlying procedure.
5.2 Calibration
Given  =  =0 5 we aim at a careful speciﬁcation of the remaining parameters. This procedure
demonstrates that the model under study can be calibrated to a speciﬁc real-world economy. The
baseline set of parameters is described by the following table.
Table 1: Baseline set of parameters.
Technology and preferences  =0 5;  =0 5;  =  =0 0042;  =0 02
Policy and outside option  =0 36;  =0 45; ¯  =0 05; ¯  =1
Initial moods [(0)] = −1111;  [(0)] = 2
The time preference rate  =0 02 is in line with usual calibrations (001 ≤  ≤ 003). The tax
rate  =0 36 is the average between the (marginal) capital income tax rate in 2000 (about 031)
and the (marginal) labor income tax rate for the average earner in 2000 (about 04) (OECD, 2007).
The policy parameter  =0 45 results from the following observation. The ratio of average public
investment across all East German regional authorities (excluding Berlin) from 1992 to 2007 and
average tax receipts across all Eastern German regional authorities (excluding Berlin) from 1992
22to 2007 amounts to 047.21 The rate of return on capital (net of taxes) ¯  is set to 5 percent and
the wage rate in the outside option is normalized to one, i.e. ¯  =1 .
We now turn to the determination of [(0)]. Assume that the domestic market wage (net of
taxes) converges to the wage rate given by the outside option ¯  at a constant rate of 0025, i.e.22
(1 − )() − ¯  =[ ( 1− )(0) − ¯ ]−0025
Plugging the RHS into (0) =
∞ Z
0
[(1 − ) − ¯ ]−,u s i n g¯  =1such that (1−)(1991)−








The expected rate of wage convergence has a signiﬁcant impact on economic conﬁdence, para-
meterized by [(0)].W eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h er a t eo fw a g ec o n v e r g e n c ei s2 . 5p e r c e n t ,w h i c h
implies a half life of nearly 28 years. Alternatively, one can assume a rate of wage convergence of
6.5 percent, implying a half life of about 10 years (These numbers come closer to the scenario that
was propagated at that time by German politicians who promised "blooming landscapes within 5
to 10 years"). In this case, the degree of pessimism would be [(0)] = −05
0085
∼ = −59.
The mobility cost parameter  is determined as follows. Notice at ﬁr s tt h a tt h es i z eo ft h e
factor endowment box is chosen such that the interior steady state is centered along both the
-dimension and the -dimension. Given the parameters we have speciﬁed so far this leads to
{∗ ∼ = 096∗ ∼ = 1929}, i.e. {¯  =2 ∗ ¯  =2 ∗}. In 1991 about 24 percent of the East
German labor force left Eastern Germany.23 Now we can determine ˙  in our model, which is








21Data on public investment are taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (2008a), data on tax receipts are taken from
Statistisches Bundesamt (2008b).
22This procedure basically follows Burda (2006).
23See Burda (2006, p. 372) and the labor force data on www.statistik-bw.de/Arbeitskreis_VGR/tbls/tab16.asp.
23Capital mobility costs are set equal to labor mobility costs, i.e.  = .24 Finally, we set
 [(0)] = 2.R e c a l lt h a t[(0)] and  [(0)] are endogenous.
5.3 Dynamic implications




[(0)] = −1111 (Baseline Scenario) or [(0)] = −59 (Scenario "Less Pessimism") for
all  ∈ {1}. The scenario "Less Pessimism" is compatible with an expected rate of wage
convergence of 65 percent (instead of 25 percent in the Baseline Scenario). Average per capita
income at  =0has been normalized to one. Notice that per capita income at  =0is the same for
both scenarios since fundamentals are identical in both cases. The time paths clearly show that
better economic conﬁdence, i.e. a higher value of [(0)], ultimately leads to a higher level of
per capita income.
The economic intuition for this observation is straightforward. Given the regional economic
fundamentals {(0) (0)} and public policy ( and ), comparably favorable moods induce
more workers and capital owners to engage in the regions’ domestic market sector. Consequently,
the scenario "Less Pessimism" enables more regions to follow a favorable economic development
heading towards the superior steady state compared to the Baseline Scenario. In the Baseline
Scenario 42 percent of the regions converge to the superior steady state, while 58 percent are
heading towards the inferior steady state state. In the scenario "Less Pessimism" 70 (30) percent
converge to the superior (inferior) steady state.25
24One might object that capital is more mobile than labor, i.e.   . H o w e v e r ,t h i si sn o tc l e a ri fw e
think of real capital reallocation instead of reallocations of ﬁnancial capital. Also, we have experimented with other
constellations, i.e.    and   . The qualitative results do not change.
25Regional per capita income may temporarily increase for regions which move towards the inferior steady state.
This requires that labor leaves the region more rapidly than capital. Conversely, regional per capita income may
decrease along the transition in regions moving towards the superior steady state.
24Figure 7: Time path of average per capita income under alternative moods.
The results of the comparative-dynamic exercises discussed above appear as gradual changes
at the aggregate level. At the regional level, however, there may be drastic changes. An increase
in economic conﬁdence may imply that a speciﬁc region converges to the superior steady state
instead of converging to the inferior steady state. Similarly, an increase in  enlarges the overlap
(see Figure 5 above). A speciﬁc region South-West of the initial overlap which gets included in
the enlarged overlap is then capable of moving towards the superior steady state instead of being
forced to follow an unfavorable development.
Finally, it should also be noticed that the associated structure of factor movements (not dis-
played) is in line with observed stylized facts listed above, i.e. there is aggregate labor outﬂow
(stylized fact #3), there is aggregate capital inﬂow (stylized fact #4), and there is regional het-
erogeneity in labor movements.
256 Summary and conclusion
Motivated by the process of economic development in Eastern Germany we have set up a dynamic
macroeconomic model of a small open economy with factor mobility and aggregate increasing
returns to scale. The model features multiple equilibria as well as (local and global) indeterminacy.
Expectations matter for the resulting equilibrium dynamics implying that "economic conﬁdence"
may be crucial for economic development.
The employed analytical setup certainly ignores several aspects of the real world. It is hence
even more remarkable that this simple model can replicate major stylized fact, like aggregate
labor outﬂows (stylized fact #3), and aggregate inﬂow of private capital (stylized fact #4). It can
therefore account for an asymmetric pattern of aggregate factor movements, as observed by Burda
(2007). The model can also replicate regional heterogeneity in labor movements, as documented by
stylized fact #3 above. Moreover, the model can explain regional divergence of per capita incomes
(stylized fact #2). This result is in line with recent empirical ﬁndings. For instance, Vollmer et
al. (2010, p. 10) investigate the convergence-divergence pattern among Eastern German regions
and conclude "...that districts in the East converge to two diﬀerent steady states regardless of
their initial GDP". Taken together, the empirical observations and the results derived from the
model set up above points to an economic structure and associated mechanisms that help to better
understand some of the major stylized facts.
As regards the determinants of economic success of speciﬁc regions (or economies), the model
does not provide a simple, but we think, an instructive story. The long term success of a speciﬁc
region (or economy) results from the interaction between economic fundamentals, economic conﬁ-
dence, and public policy in a non-trivial fashion. More speciﬁcally, suﬃciently favorable (unfavor-
able) initial conditions imply that a speciﬁc region experiences a favorable (unfavorable) economic
development. For initial conditions in an intermediate range, expectations become crucial in the
process of equilibrium selection. However, even though there is a multiplicity of admissible expec-
tations it is important to notice that expectations must be fundamentally warranted. This implies
26that (admissible) expectations depend on initial conditions and on public policy. An intensiﬁcation
of, say, macroeconomic supply side policy (captured by an increase in the share of local tax receipts
used to ﬁnance productive government expenditures, )h a st w oe ﬀects. First, it gives expectations
a greater role by strengthening the interdependence among the agents’ decisions to engage in the
domestic market sector; technically speaking it increases the size of the overlap. Second, it allows
agents to become more optimistic since the "degree of optimism" is measured by the diﬀerence
between the Western German and the Eastern German wage rate, in present value terms, where
the latter depends positively on .
The model under study may also be helpful when it comes to better understand the "puzzle
of limited convergence", as noted by Uhlig (2006).26 The numerical evaluation has demonstrated
that the long run value of (average) per capita income depends critically on initial expectations.
Moreover, the lower the expected rate at which the Eastern German converges to the Western
German wage rate, the stronger is the implied degree of economic pessimism in Eastern Germany.
Consequently, in a world with multiple equilibria and global indeterminacy, comparably many
Eastern German regions experience an unfavorable economic development. In contrast, a higher
expected rate of wage convergence implies a lower degree of pessimism such that more regions
experience a favorable economic development. Therefore, the expected rate of wage convergence
aﬀects long run GDP per capita at the aggregate level.
26Real GDP per capita in Eastern relative to Western Germany stood at 30 percent in 1991, reached about
60 percent in 1996 and approached 70 percent in 2007 (Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der
Laender", 2008(a)).
277A p p e n d i x
7.1 Notes on stability ( =  =0 5)
We assume that  =  =0 5. The Jacobian matrix of system (20) to (21) then reads as follows
 =
⎛




00 5(1 − ) 0
05(1 − ) 00 
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Several remarks are at order:




2( − 1)22, which boils down to 2( −1)22  0 being always true.
2. As regards 12, we need a case distinction: Provided that 2  2
p
2( − 1)22 eigen-
values 12 are conjugate complex with positive real parts 1
20.
3. If, on the other hand, 2  2
p
2( − 1)22 eigenvalues 12 are real valued. Eigenvalue




2( − 1)22. This condition boils down
to 2( − 1)22  0, which is always true.
The set of eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix associated with the dynamic system (19), (20),
(21), and (22) with  and  given by (4) and (5) exhibits the following pattern: there are three
eigenvalues with positive real parts and one eigenvalue with negative real part.27 Since there are
27This can be shown analytically for  =  =0 5. In addition, numerical evaluations indicate that this pattern is
stable also in the non-linear case.
28two jump variables and three unstable roots, the interior steady state is unstable.
Local indeterminacy. There is a three-dimensional, unstable manifold which leads the econ-
omy away from the interior steady state. Since the state space has dimension two, there is (local)
indeterminacy. Given an initial condition (0) = 0 and (0) = 0 there are diﬀerent combina-
tions {(0) (0)} which lead the economy to the inferior steady state (superior steady state),
i.e. there is a multiplicity of paths leading to the inferior steady state (superior steady state).
Global indeterminacy. Given an initial condition (0) = 0 and (0) = 0 inside the over-
lap there are diﬀerent possible combinations {(0) (0)} such that the economy evolves either
to the inferior steady state { =0 =0 } or to the superior steady state { = ∗∗= ¯ }.





































Figure A1: Eigenvalues (real parts) in response to changes in  and . Notice that the horizontal
line represents the two (identical) real parts of a pair of conjugate complex eigenvalues.
7.2 Notes on equilibrium dynamics
Reasoning of Fukao and Benabou (1993). Fukao and Benabou (1993, Proposition 2) have
shown that, within the one-factor Krugman (1991) model, equilibrium trajectories must satisfy
two conditions: (i) the shadow price of the factor reaching the boundary must approach zero and
29(ii) once the boundary has been touched, equilibrium implies that the economy remains at the
boundary forever. The reasoning relies on an arbitrage condition, which must hold in equilibrium,
and applies also to the model under study: assume that the economy hits, say, the lower -boundary
at  =  (i.e. ()=0with 0)w i t h()  0. In this case, each individual worker has an
incentive to deviate from the trajectory under consideration since he can realize the gain, reﬂected
by ()  0, an instant in time later and thereby avoid all relocation costs (the individual is
of measure zero) by moving one period later. Hence, any equilibrium trajectory must hit the
-boundary such that ()=0 .
A similar reasoning applies to the case when the economy is located at the boundary and
remains there forever. Assume the economy is located at the lower -boundary (i.e.  =0and
0). In this case ¯  applies. It would indeed be optimal for workers to return into
the domestic market sector. This will, however, never happen. Each individual worker has an
incentive to realize the gain, reﬂected by ¯ , an instant in time later by moving alone and
thereby avoiding relocation costs. Hence, the fact that the economy does not return into the
interior of the state region is essentially due to a coordination failure in market equilibrium.
The arbitrage argument used here relies on one crucial assumption, namely that the individ-
ual agent is of measure zero. This guarantees that the deviation of any individual from a given
trajectory does not change competitive factor rewards and hence leaves  and  unchanged.
Moreover, this assumption guarantees that relocation costs are zero if one agent moves in isola-
tion.28 Therefore, this reasoning extends to the two-factor case under consideration with atomistic
agents implying that equilibrium trajectories must approach the border of the state region tangen-
tial, i.e. satisfying either ˙ ()=()=0or ˙ ()=()=0and, in addition, remains at
the border of the state space once the economy hits the boundary.
Boundary dynamics. Assume that the economy hits, say, the -border at  = , i.e. ()=
28Notice that "reallocation costs" are essentially congestion costs, i.e. marginal moving costs are zero at the
origin.
300 or ()=¯ ,w i t h0  ()  ¯ . The dynamics of the economy are then governed by (20)
and (22) (noting that ()=0or ()=¯ ). The shadow price  at  =  jumps in order to
satisfy the transversality condition. Next assume that the economy hits the -border at  = ,
i.e. ()=0or ()= ¯ ,w i t h0  ()  ¯ . The dynamics of the economy are then governed
by (19) and (21) (noting that ()=0or ()= ¯ ). The shadow price  at  =  jumps in
order to satisfy the transversality condition. A non-formal sketch of equilibrium dynamics at the
border of the state space is as follows. Assume that the economy touches the -axis at  = ,
i.e. ()=0 . The rate of return then is ()=0and, hence, capitalists leave the domestic
market sector (in ﬁnite time). This movement is sluggish because of convex adjustment costs.
An equivalent reasoning applies for ()=0and ()=0 . Now assume that the economy
touches the upper border of the state region, i.e. ()=¯  for some  = .A s s u m e f u r t h e r
that (1−)(¯  ¯ )  ¯ . Capitalists then increase the amount of capital allocated to the domestic
market sector until (1 − ) =¯ . An equivalent reasoning holds true if the economy hits the right
border of the state region  = ¯ .
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